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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses a recent proposal of the Australian Government to reform the 
existing Medicare system. It develops models of the physician’s behaviour and of a 
household’s demand for medical insurance under the proposed system, and then proceeds 
to characterise the equilibrium under the new proposals. It argues that those most likely 
to be made worse off are low income households with children, though a full evaluation 
of the effects of the proposal requires it to be analysed in a public finance framework. 
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1. Introduction
In April 2003 the Federal Government of Australia, in the person of the Minister 
for Health and Ageing, presented proposals for a far-reaching reform of the Medicare 
system, with the declared aim of improving access to Medicare services and of making 
these services, in particular those provided by general practitioners (GPs) and specialist 
physicians,1 “more affordable”. The aim of this paper is to carry out an economic analysis 
of these proposals, to try to predict and evaluate their likely effects. 
The existing system is regarded by many as having worked well, providing 
universal access to GPs free of charge to the majority of patients, and at an overall cost 
which compares quite favourably to medical expenditures in other countries. Physicians 
are self-employed and free to set their own fees. However, the government specifies a 
Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS) of fees for each kind of treatment. A GP can bill the 
health service directly for a fee of 85% of the MBS amount, known as “bulk billing”. In 
this case the patient pays nothing. Alternatively, the GP can charge the patient directly 
whatever she thinks appropriate. In the latter case the patient pays the fee out of pocket 
and claims back from Medicare the 85% of the MBS fee. Private insurance for the gap 
between the fee and the amount refunded is not allowed. Under this system, the GP saves 
costs by bulk billing rather than billing patients directly. At the same time, the obvious 
advantages to patients and the force of competition among GPs act in favour of bulk 
billing.2 Overall, therefore, there are good incentives to restrain costs3 while providing 
patients with universal free access to GPs. This holds true as long as the level of fees 
under the MBS allows GPs to receive adequate remuneration under bulk billing. It is 
argued, however, that the real value of these fees is being steadily eroded by a failure to 
adjust them for inflation, and as a result the proportion of physicians choosing to bulk bill 
is declining. This is particularly the case in areas where population density is low, so that 
competitive pressures are weaker while costs tend to be higher. 
The policy response to this problem has been to propose two key changes, in the 
context of a new General Practice Access Scheme (GPAS), which GPs are given 
substantial incentives to join. First, GPs who join the scheme and set a fee higher than 
                                                 
 
1 For simplicity all non-hospital physicians will be covered under the term GPs. 
2 See Savage and Jones (2004). 
3 Note, however, that the “ex post moral hazard problem”, whereby patients for whom treatment is free at 
the margin have an incentive to expand their demand, and the “supplier induced demand problem”, under 
which physicians have an incentive to advise patients that they should have more treatment than is socially 
1 
85% of the MBS level will be able to bill Medicare directly for this portion of their fee, 
which the patient has in the past had to pay and reclaim. Secondly, patients will be 
allowed to take out private insurance to cover the gap between this and the overall fee, 
though it is important to note that the policy proposal specifies a substantial deductible of 
$1000 per household for these insurance policies. Thus it implies a significant degree of 
co-payment of the gap between Medicare rebate and physician’s fee. At the same time, 
premiums will be subject to the 30% subsidy that currently applies to insurance 
premiums for hospital health care. The first measure reduces the cost advantage to the GP 
of limiting the fee to the bulk billing level. The second, critics argue, drastically weakens 
the competitive pressures constraining overall fee levels.  
In addition, low-income households, holders of a “concession card”,4 will still 
receive free treatment. The inadequacy of the current MBS fee levels is implicitly 
recognised by making, to GPs who join the GPAS, a direct payment for each concession 
cardholder receiving treatment, in effect making a selective increase in the MBS level for 
these patients only.5 Rather than raising the fee levels overall and funding this out of 
general taxation, which would preserve the existing system, the policy envisages that 
increases in fee levels to non-holders of concession cards will be met by private insurance 
premium revenue, net of the proposed $1000 deductible. If not immediately, then over 
time, the control on fee levels represented by the current bulk billing system seems likely 
to disappear. The policy will essentially create a two-tier health system in non-hospital 
health care, by privatising provision for non-concession cardholders, to an extent 
determined by the relative values of 85% of the MBS fee and the excess of the actual fee 
over this. 
In applying an economic analysis to provide more detailed predictions about the 
effects of this policy, there are two key sets of decisions that have to be modelled. The 
first concerns the physician. What determines whether she will respond to the policy by 
switching from bulk billing for non-concession card holders and raising fees? What 
determines the extent to which fees will be raised? The second concerns the household. 
Given that people differ in their income levels and probabilities of needing health care of 
different levels of cost, how will they respond to physicians’ fee increases and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
optimal, are not solved by this type of system. 
4 Essentially comprising war veterans, retirees and low-income earners. 
5 Thus the GP will receive $1 per visit by a cardholder in capital cities, $2.95 in other metropolitan centres, 
$5.30 in rural centres and $6.30 in remote areas. 
2 
possibility of buying private insurance? In the next three sections we analyse models 
drawn from the literature on health economics and the economics of insurance markets to 
suggest some answers to these questions.6 In section 2 we set up a model of the present 
system, to examine the determinants of a physician’s choice between bulk billing and 
charging a higher fee, in the absence of an insurance possibility, and given the difference 
in billing costs in the two cases. We then go on to examine the household’s reaction to 
the policy changes, using an expected utility approach. This analysis suggests that the 
market for a physician’s services will in fact consist of four segments - perhaps it would 
be more appropriate to talk about a four tier system as resulting from the policy changes. 
We then return to the model of the physician to analyse how her fee setting policy might 
develop in the light of this. The section following presents some empirical information on 
the characteristics of households that currently buy private health insurance, to help in the 
assessment of who will gain and who will lose under the policy. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. A Model of Physician’s Choice
We begin by modelling the GPs decision whether to bulk bill, i.e. to set the price 
for her services at the regulated level7 0p ,  or to set a higher price p.  In this section we 
take the present set-up, in which patients are not allowed to take out private insurance for 
the gap 0p p− .
)
We use the model to clarify conditions under which the GP will or will 
not bulk bill. 
We regard the GP as a particular kind of firm, producing a single output under 
constant returns and supplying her services under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. She is motivated in the first place by net income, given by  
 
 [ ( ) ] (p c q e b x p q− , − ,  
 
Here, p  is the price per unit of service,  is the constant per unit cost, which depends on 
the quality of service q  and the effort expended in controlling costs,  and  is the unit 
cost of billing. 
c
e, b
x  is demand for her services, a decreasing function of price and 
                                                 
6 The Foundation papers on insurance are Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). Further 
developments relevant to health included Crocker and Snow (1984), Hoy (1982,1984) and, more recently, 
Strohmenger and Wambach (2000). For a useful general survey in the health insurance context see Cutler 
and Zeckhauser (2000). 
7 This is 85% of the MBS fee. 
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increasing in quality. She is not however motivated solely by net income: the function 
 increasing in both its arguments, expresses in money terms the utility she obtains 
from treating patients 
( )g x q, ,
x  with care of quality q , while ( )eγ ,  an increasing convex 
function, gives the cost involved in controlling service costs. Thus her maximand is 
 
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )u p c q e b x p q g x q eγ= − , − , + , −     (1) 
 
To analyse the decision whether to bulk bill, we solve first the problem of 
choosing p,   and e  then that of choosing only  and  with q , q e 0p p= ,  to maximise u.  
She will choose to bulk bill if and only if her utility at the second optimum is greater than 
that at the first. Under bulk billing, the billing cost  is less than that if she does not bulk 
bill.  
0b
The first order conditions for the two problems are, first for non bulk billing8
 
    (2) [ ( ) ] (p x pu p g c q e b x x p q
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= + − , − + , =) 0
0
0
0
0
      (3) ( )q q x q qu c x p q g x g
∗ ∗= − , + + =
 
       (4) ( ) ( )e eu c x p q eγ ′∗ ∗ ∗= − , − =
 
where asterisks denote optimal values. The first condition is almost, but not quite, 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, since the marginal utility of treating patients 
works as a kind of subsidy to demand. The second condition equates the marginal cost of 
quality to its marginal utility, taking account also of its effect on demand, and the third 
equates the marginal benefit of cost reduction, which depends on the total output, to its 
marginal cost. 
For bulk billing we have 
 
      (5) 0 0( )q q x q qu c x p q g x g= − , + + =
 
       (6) 0 0 0( ) ( )e eu c x p q eγ ′= − , − =
4 
 and the GP chooses bulk billing if and only if 
  
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( 0 )p c q e b x p q g x q eγ− , − , + , −    (7) 
 
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )p c q e b x p q g x q eγ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗≥ − , − , + , − ∗    (8) 
 
To interpret these conditions, note first that if  and e  did not enter the problem, the 
physician would choose not to bulk bill if demand were sufficiently inelastic, that the 
increase in revenue from increasing price, after allowing for any loss of utility from 
treating fewer patients, more than offsets the increased billing costs. Thus the lower the 
degree of competition, and the lower the billing cost differential, the less likely is bulk 
billing. Introducing  does not complicate this picture unduly. Since 
q
e x  falls with a move 
from bulk billing, the optimal  will also fall, so that service costs rise with a move from 
bulk billing. Introducing  could cause complications, depending on the strength of its 
effect on demand. A fall in 
e
q
x  induced by the rise in price reduces the marginal cost of 
quality and so, other things equal, will increase its amount. This has the effect of 
increasing demand. Provided however this effect is weaker than the demand reducing 
effect of the price increase, we have the conclusion that a physician who switches from 
bulk billing will serve fewer patients at a higher price, a higher service quality and higher 
unit cost. She is more likely to switch, the lower the elasticity of demand and the smaller 
the billing cost differential. 
We can think of the effect of cost inflation over time, unmatched by increases in 
the MBS, as a reduction in 0p  (in other words the prices, costs and revenues in the above 
model are all in real terms). As long as 0p  is above costs, if demand is sufficiently elastic 
this could actually increase the difference between utility from bulk billing and utility 
from setting a higher fee, given also that the physician receives utility from an increase in 
the number of patients. But ultimately, of course, the latter must win out. 
The proposed policy measure, allowing GPs to bill Medicare for that portion of 
their fee that they would have received had they stayed with bulk billing, can be thought 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 A subscript denotes a partial derivative with respect to the corresponding variable. 
5 
of as reducing the difference between b  and . Thus for this reason alone we would 
expect to see a reduction in bulk billing. The second main element in the proposal is the 
introduction of the possibility of insurance to cover the gap between the fee charged by 
the physician and the bulk billing rate, subject to the deductible of $1000. If this reduces 
the price elasticity of demand, this will provide a further incentive to switch from bulk 
billing. Thus we have to analyse the relationship between the availability of insurance 
and the demand elasticity. 
0b
 Before doing this in the next section, it is worth making three points, which 
suggest that physicians may well perceive, on the introduction of the policy, that they are 
faced with low demand elasticity. First, we need to distinguish between the ceteris 
paribus demand elasticity, such as that implicitly analysed above, where the GP is 
considering the effect of increasing her fee with all other GPs fees held constant, and the 
mutatis mutandis elasticity, where all physicians simultaneously change fee levels. If GPs 
are aware that, as a result of the policy, their competitors will also be raising their fees, 
they will be less inhibited by the risk of demand reductions. In other words, the mutatis 
mutandis elasticity is significantly lower than the ceteris paribus elasticity. 
Secondly, and related to this, it is unlikely that an individual GP would perceive a 
relationship between an increase in her fees and the insurance premium, even though this 
premium will of course be affected by physicians’ choices of fees in the aggregate.9 Thus 
any one GP, in deciding to raise her fees under the new system, is likely to underestimate 
the actual demand response arising from a general fee increase, which will have a 
significant impact on insurance premiums. 
Finally, the presence of concession cardholders allows a degree of price 
discrimination based on income in this market. GPs are in effect faced with a demand 
function corresponding to the two thirds of the market with higher incomes than the 
concession cardholders. This should also reduce their perceived demand elasticity.  
 
3. Households
Households differ in respect of their net of tax income level,  
R  and risk of ill health. There are three possible health states, 
min max[ ]y y y∈ , ⊂
+ , 0 1 2s = , , ,  In health state 
                                                 
9 In other words, an increase in any one physician’s fees has a negligible effect on the insurance premium 
and can be neglected by the individual physician, regardless of what the others are doing. 
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0, the individual is well and requires no health services, in state 1 she is moderately sick 
and requires treatment, which however costs less than the $1000 deductible for private 
insurance, while in state 3 she is sufficiently seriously ill as to incur costs in excess of this 
deductible. We assume two possible types of patients in respect of their risk levels,10 
denoted by the probability of sickness sjπ ,  with j L H= ,  and 2 2H Lπ π> .  That is, a “high 
risk” is someone with a higher probability of making a claim greater than the deductible. 
We analyse the decision on whether to buy private health insurance, taking the 
amount, quality and cost of treatment as given and independent of the insurance decision. 
Then the decision on whether or not to buy insurance is based on a straightforward 
comparison of expected utilities. This requires us to specify how a patient behaves if she 
falls sick but has not bought private insurance. One possibility is that she would pay the 
fee out of pocket. A second is that she will go to a public hospital to obtain free treatment 
as an outpatient. Since this will usually involve queueing and waiting costs, we take it 
that the patient’s utility in this case will be less than if she received treatment free of 
charge from a GP. Thus we assume that if patients receive treatment by going to a public 
hospital, they pay nothing and achieve a utility level 0 ( )u . ,  which is less than their utility 
level if they do not fall sick, ( )wu . .  If they buy private insurance, they pay a premium r,  
net of the government subsidy, which does not depend on risk type.11 The advantage of 
private treatment is that they will have the utility12 ( )wu . .  We can then define the 
following expected utilities, for j L H= ,   
 
 
2
0
0 0
1
( ) ( ) ( )j j w sj
s
y u y u yu π π
=
= + ∑       (9) 
 
 0 1 0 2( ) ( ) ( ) (Pj j w j j wy r d u y r u y r u y r du π π π, , = − + − + − − )]
                                                
  (10) 
 
 
10 In reality of course there may be many more. For example, patients of each possible age may represent a 
different risk type, and within each age class there will also be variation in sickness probabilities. The 
assumption of two types keeps the notation simple while, hopefully, not losing anything of substance in the 
analysis. 
11 In fact the premium paid depends on age, with a 2% increase for every year over thirty. We ignore this 
for the moment, but discuss it below. 
12 The assumption that private treatment restores the utility level to that if well is just to simplify notation. 
The important point is that it is higher than the utility of going to a public hospital because of the absence 
of costs of waiting for treatment and other time costs. 
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and  
 
 0 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) (Ij j w j w L j wy r d e u y r u y r e u y r du π π π, , , = − + − − + − − )]  (11) 
 
where  is the deductible, 1000d $= Le  is the cost of private treatment in the low cost 
case. 
 The first is the expected utility of someone who does not buy insurance and goes 
to a free public hospital for outpatient treatment if they fall ill. The second is that of 
someone with private insurance, who goes to the public hospital in the case where private 
treatment costs less than the deductible, rather than paying these costs out of pocket. 
Finally there is the household that buys insurance and always goes for private treatment, 
paying out of pocket where necessary.13
  
Then, defining the differences for j L H= ,  
  
 0P Pjj u u∆ = − j         (12) 
 
 0I Ijj u u∆ = − j         (13) 
 
 IP Ijj u u∆ = − Pj         (14) 
 
 
a household’s choice is determined by these utility differences.  
It is easy to see that the first two utility differences are decreasing in insurance 
premium and deductible. Of interest is to clarify how the incentive to buy private 
insurance varies with illness probability and income. We have 
 
 
0
( ) ( )
P
j
w w
j
u y r u yπ
∂∆ = − − <∂ 0
                                                
      (15) 
 
13There is a fourth logical possibility, that of someone who does not buy insurance but pays for private 
treatment, in all cases, if they fall ill. We assume that this is always dominated by one of the cases with 
insurance. 
8 
  0 0
1
( ) ( )
P
j
j
u y r u yπ
∂∆ = − − <∂ 0       (16) 
 
 0
2
( ) (
P
j
w
j
u y r d u yπ
∂∆ = − − −∂ )0       (17) 
 
It is of course intuitive that the larger the probability of not falling ill, the less 
likely it is that insurance will be bought, other things (especially the premium) being 
equal. Less obvious is the result that, other things equal, the larger the probability of only 
being moderately ill, the less likely that insurance will be bought. The reason is of course 
that because of the deductible, insurance brings no benefit, but only incurs a cost, in this 
case. Thus insurance will be bought only by those with a large enough probability that 
they will incur treatment costs in excess of the deductible, and moreover, for whom the 
utility associated with free treatment at a public hospital is sufficiently below that of 
treatment by a GP. Then, for those for whom this condition is satisfied, the likelihood of 
buying insurance rises with the probability of being sick enough to incur treatment costs 
in excess of the deductible. The results for Ij∆  are essentially similar. 
 
In the case of income, we have 
 
 0 1 0 0 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( )] ( )]
P
j
j w w j j wu y r u y u y r u y u y r d u yy
π π π′ ′ ′ ′ ′∂∆ = − − + − − + − − −∂ 0
′
 (18) 
 
Given risk aversion, the first two terms are certainly positive, the sign of the third 
depends on how public and private treatment affect relatively the marginal utility of 
income. It seems reasonable to assume that this is unlikely to offset, and could well 
reinforce, the effect of the income difference, and so the expression is assumed to be 
positive overall: the higher the household’s income, the more likely private insurance is 
to be bought.14 Again, the results for Ij∆  are essentially similar. 
Finally, we have 
9 
  
      (19) 1 [ ( ) ( )]
IP
j j w Lu y r e u y rπ∆ = − − − −0
 
The sign of this is independent of the probability and depends only on whether the higher 
utility from private treatment is “worth the money”. We then have 
  
 1 [ ( ) ( )]
IP
j
j w Lu y r e u y ry
π ′ ′∂∆ = − − − −∂ 0      (20) 
 
Given risk aversion, this is most likely to be positive. It will then also be 
decreasing in the insurance premium and out of pocket expenses. Thus we would say that 
of the set of households that buy insurance, those who do not go to their GP’s when costs 
are below the deductible will be the lower income households in this set. 
Following from all this, we can confirm the intuition that the subset of households 
who buy private treatment can be expected to contain the higher risk, higher income 
households  while the subset not buying private treatment, if not empty, must contain the 
lower income, lower risk households
,
.  Moreover, if a subset of households with given 
income buy private insurance, then so must all households with higher income and the 
same risk level, or higher risk level with the same income. We define  as the critical 
income level at which households of risk type 
jy
∗
j H L= ,  buy private insurance, with risk 
type being defined as above by 2 jπ . Thus the jy∗  satisfy the condition 
  
 0( ) ( )P Pj jj j jy r d yu u
∗ ∗∆ = , , − = 0
                                                                                                                                                
      (21) 
 
The subsets of households not buying insurance are those with   . Clearly this 
subset will be larger for low risks than for high risks, and both are increasing in the 
premium and deductible. 
jy ≤ jy∗
 
 
14 This is supported by the empirical evidence presented in Section 5 below. 
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 Figure 1:  Segmentation by income level and risk type 
P
 
Figure 1 illustrates, on the assumption that all these subsets are non-empty, and  is the 
income level such that households with income below this level receive the concession 
card, i.e. free treatment. 
Cy
 
We conclude this section by considering the determinants of the insurance 
premium, since the level of this will play an important role in determining the sizes of the 
uninsured subsets of households. Let λ  denote the proportion of low risk households15 in 
the population, assumed the same at each income level y,  and  the income 
distribution function.
( )F y
16 We derive the premium in three steps:  
(i) Assume there is no differentiation according to risk class, so that the premium 
will be based on the pooled probability of an insurance claim. To calculate 
this, note that the proportion of the population buying insurance is  
 
       (22) (1 )
L Hy
dF dFβ λ λ∗∞= + −∫ ∫y∗∞
                                                 
15 That is, those with the lower probability of having a doctor’s bill in excess of the deductible, i.e. less 
likely to make a claim on their insurance. 
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       (23) [1 ( )] (1 )[1 ( )]LF y F yλ λ∗= − + − − H∗
 
Then, defining  
 
 [1 ( )]LF yµ λ ∗≡ − /β        (24) 
 
as the proportion of insurance buyers who are low risks, the pooled probability of an 
insurance claim is 
 
 2 (1 ) 2L Hπ µπ µ π= + −       (25) 
 
Note the dependence of this on the critical income levels at which the respective risk 
groups buy insurance.  
(ii) Denote the claim per contract net of the deductible by c,  which of course is a 
function of the physician’s fee ( )c p ;   
(iii) Then the premium gross of subsidy is set to cover expected claims costs plus 
a loading  for costs and profit, so that we have the premium net of 
subsidy 
0k >
 
 (1 )(1 )r s k cπ= − +        (26) 
 
with  the government subsidy to private insurance. 0 3s = .
We see then that an increase in the physician’s fee has two possible effects on the 
insurance premium. First, it has a direct effect in raising c.  However, this increase in 
premium will, if it changes the demands for insurance by the different risk groups 
differentially, change the value of µ  and therefore π .  For example, an adverse selection 
effect would arise when the initial increase in c  causes a fall in µ,  an increase in π ,  a 
further increase in  a further fall in r, µ,  and so on, until only high risk buyers are left in 
                                                                                                                                                 
( )F y
′
y y
′≤ .16  gives the proportion of households with income  
12 
the market.17  
Thus the higher are GPs fees, the higher will be the insurance premium and the 
smaller will be the subsets of households insured, and the higher their average income 
level. The larger the uninsured subsets, the larger the demands for outpatient treatment on 
the public hospital system. The model clarifies the parameters that would need to be 
estimated empirically to be able to predict quantitatively the effects of the proposed 
policy. Presumably the government has already made these estimates.  
 
4. Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the health services and insurance markets is represented by a 
fee level for physicians, a corresponding insurance premium, and a fee level for 
concession card holders (paid by the government), such that:  
• no physician wishes to change her fee given the flow of patients forthcoming;  
• no individual wishes to change her insurance purchase decision given the 
level of physicians’ fees and the insurance premium;  
• all concession card holders receive treatment if required. 
We have seen in the previous section that, given the distribution of incomes, 
utilities and risk types in the population, we can partition households into four subsets:  
• the lowest income group, concession card holders;  
• the next lowest income group, containing also a higher proportion of low risk 
types than the population as a whole. These do not buy insurance and use 
public hospital outpatients departments if they need health care;  
• the second highest income group, who buy private insurance, but use a public 
hospital if their treatment cost is less than the deductible;  
• the highest income group, who buy private insurance and always use private 
treatment, paying out of pocket when necessary. 
 An important point is that, at the margin, the number of households in each of these 
groups will be sensitive to the insurance premium as well as to the cost of treatment 
below the deductible.  
                                                 
17 Butler (2003) argues convincingly that this kind of process has characterised the market for insurance to 
cover costs of hospital treatment in Australia. The source of the problem of course is the absence of 
premium differentiation between risk classes in a private insurance market, where participation is voluntary 
and cross-subsidisation of high by low risks cannot be enforced. 
13 
After the introduction of the policy, and assuming that a significant proportion of 
households buy insurance, any individual GP will see herself as faced by a very inelastic 
demand, for the reasons set out at the end of section 2, and as a result we would expect 
significant fee increases. This is unlikely to represent an equilibrium, however, because, 
as we saw in the previous section, demand for insurance and hence for GPs services is 
elastic to the insurance premium. Sooner or later therefore, probably, given political 
sensitivities, sooner, there will have to be a fee negotiated between insurers and 
physicians. Call this Ip .  Then any one physician will see herself as faced with two 
possible sources of demand, each with a fixed price. In order of decreasing prices, these 
are:  
• insured patients, with price Ip ;  
• concession cardholders, with price Cp ;  
Given the fixity of prices, a GP competes for private patients by choosing quality 
of service, denoted  in the model of section 2, and cost reducing effort  while 
choosing the number of concession card holders she wants to treat. However, she 
perceives upper limits to the number of insured patients she could receive, denoted 
q e,
0
Ix . 
We then model her choice problem as that of maximizing 
  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (I I I C C Cu p x p q p x p q c q e X g X q e)γ= , + , − , + , −   (27) 
 
       (28) 0 ( )
I I I Cs t x x p q x. . ≥ , ≥ 0
C
 
where IX x x= +  is total demand. First order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are 
  
 ( )I IX q q
u p c g x c X
q
λ∂ = − + − − =∂ 0      (29) 
 
 0 0C C CXC
u p c g x x
x x
∂ = − + ≤ ≥ =∂ ∂ 0C
u∂     (30) 
 
 ( ) 0e
u c X e
e
γ ′∂ = − − =∂       (31) 
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     (32) 0 0( ) 0 [ ( )]
I I I I I Ix x p q x x p qλ λ≥ , ≥ − , = 0
.
 
These results imply three possible types of equilibria: 
  
(i) 0 > ( , )
I I Ix x p q   In this case, insured patients are sufficiently plentiful that only 
these are treated;  
(ii) 0 ( , )
I I Ix x p q=   but 0.Cx =  Essentially the same as (i);  
(iii) 0 ( , )
I I Ix x p q=   and  Both types of patient are treated.  > 0.Cx   
 
However there is nothing to guarantee that all concession card holders in the aggregate 
are treated. For this, Cp  would have to be set sufficiently high, and/or Ip  sufficiently 
low. 
To summarise: what drives the equilibrium is the physician’s objective of 
maximising utility (which contains a non-monetary factor reflecting desire to treat 
patients in general and preference for high-quality treatment), given the way in which 
patient demand for her services responds to her quality. Setting quality is the way in 
which physicians compete, since fee levels, for insured patients as well as for 
cardholders, are set by central negotiation rather than by the individual physician. It is 
quite possible that at the given set of fee levels, for insured patients as well as for 
cardholders, the number of the latter that GPs would want to treat in the aggregate is less 
than the total number of cardholders, in which case, if quota restrictions are not to be 
introduced,18 either the cardholder fee would have to be raised, the fee for insured 
patients lowered, or both, to achieve an overall equilibrium.  
 
5. Income and Insurance Demand: Evidence
The models presented in the previous sections suggest the kind of market 
segmentation likely to result from the proposed policy, given that households vary by 
income and risk type. Empirically, households also differ along other dimensions relevant 
for the analysis, most notably by demographic characteristics reflecting their phase in the 
                                                 
18 Every GP must take a certain minimum number of cardholder patients. Note that under the GPAS a GP 
must be prepared to take cardholder patients, but no minimum number above zero is specified, so 1 would 
suffice. This could easily be incorporated into the above problem with no significant change in results. 
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life cycle. To add empirical flesh to the bare bones of the analysis, we present some data 
on the current situation, in which private insurance for hospital care, but not for GP 
treatment, is available. We consider how insurance and health care costs are distributed 
along three main dimensions: stage in the life cycle, income, and female employment 
status. 
We see it as most useful to organise life cycle data not on the usual basis of 
calendar age of the household head, but rather according to the presence and ages of 
children. This is because the absence of perfect capital markets, in which children, or 
parents on their behalf, could borrow against future income, implies that children are 
costly to parents. Our approach reflects the view that two families, one with a head of 
household aged say 25, the other with head aged say 35, and with two children under 
school age, have far more in common with each other than with a childless household 
with a head of the same age. 
  
We therefore define six life cycle phases of couples as follows: 
  
Phase 1: the couple has as yet no children and the wife is aged thirty-five or less;  
Phase 2: at least one pre-school child is present in the household;  
Phase 3: the children are of lower school age;  
Phase 4: the children are of high school age;  
Phase 5: at least one spouse is in full time work, the children have left home; and  
Phase 6: both spouses are retired.  
 
Data for a sample of 3994 couples are taken from the ABS 1998 Household 
Expenditure Survey. The sample is split into the six phases according to the ages of the 
children (if present), the age of the female partner and the employment status of both 
adults. Phases 1 to 6 contain 385, 708, 609, 737, 757 and 798 records, respectively.19  
Table 1 shows the general life cycle relationship between annual income and 
health expenditures, in $1998. Column 1 lists weighted data means for annual net 
household income20 and column 2, for private health expenditure. The percentage of 
                                                 
19 For further detail on the criteria used to split the sample into the six phases, see Apps and Rees (2003). 
20 Net income is calculated as private household income net of income taxes, the Medicare Levy, family tax 
benefits and direct (cash) benefits. 
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households purchasing private health insurance in each phase is shown in column 3 and 
the average insurance premium they pay is reported in column 4. Column 5 lists data 
means for government indirect health benefits (hospital and non-hospital treatment) and 
column 6 shows separately government spending on medical benefits (non-hospital 
treatment). 
 
Table 1: Income, health expenditures and government benefits 
 
Phase  Net Inc  Priv H-
Exp  
% 
Insd  
Prem  Gov 
Ben  
Med 
Ben   
1  49833  1483  37.4  1303  2731  1086   
2  40693  1757  37.2  1640  6475  2350   
3  46268  1866  39.2  1578  4533  1968   
4  53837  2456  50.8  1844  4748  1854   
5  50242  2651  53.3  1964  4082  1478   
6  22209  1985  46.7  1682  7665  1769   
All  42763  2079  43.8  1730  5114  1737  
*Weighted data means. 
 
This table certainly does not contradict the model of section 3. At each income level, not 
all households insure (the model says that those that do (not) are the relatively high (low) 
risk groups), though of course within each phase there is a range of incomes, so some of 
the non-insured would also be lower income households in all risk groups. Also notable 
is the fact that the major beneficiaries of government non-hospital benefits, after retirees 
(who would typically be concession cardholders), are families with young children. 
The data means for each life cycle phase in Table 1 conceal a very high degree of 
heterogeneity in female labour supply behaviour and its association with health 
expenditure and insurance, after the arrival of children.21 Table 2 tries to bring this out by 
presenting life cycle profiles for a sample of 2827 “in-work” households in phases 1 to 5, 
with phase 2 to 5 split into two groups of equal size according to the market hours of the 
                                                 
21 We attribute this heterogeneity to differences in domestic productivities across otherwise identical 
households, together with the fact that household production (particularly of child care) is a close substitute 
for market production after the arrival of children. For further discussion, see Apps and Rees (2003). 
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female partner.22 We label the two groups type 1 and type 2. Thus, type 1 households are 
those in which the female partner works mostly within the home, while in type 2 
households she has a much more significant market labour supply. We also split the 
sample into two groups of equal size within each phase according to the income of the 
male partner as primary earner. The table reports separate results for households with 
primary incomes in the lower and upper 50% of the distribution of primary income in 
each phase.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of health cover by primary income and household type 
                 
 
  Lower  50%   Upper  50%   
Hhld 
Type  
Phase  M Inc  F Inc  % Insd M Inc  F Inc  % Insd 
1&2  1  26854  22337  27.8  51912  34921  48.3   
 2  26889  1144  22.1  61781  1333  44.8   
1  3  25070  5771  28.7  70023  6730  49.4   
 4  24752  8995  36.5  66581  12168  62.2   
 5  21121  7910  48.1  61806  7466  57.5   
 2  27352  17554  37.9  55554  29557  60.9   
2  3  23575  21668  35.5  60034  32716  58.8   
 4  27762  23912  49.7  65648  37941  71.6   
 5  23733  22220  53.3  51039  35910  65.7   
1&2  6  226  422  30.6  13646  7267  63.3  
  
 
The association of female labour force participation with health insurance demand 
are striking. In phases 2 to 4 of the life cycle, insurance demand increases by around 50% 
at the lower income levels, and 25% at the higher income levels, when the wife goes out 
to work. Also striking is the effect of income on insurance demand at all stages of the life 
cycle. Noteworthy however is that even among households with the highest insurance 
demand, two-earner high-income households with older children, or whose children have 
left home, around 30% of households do not buy health insurance. The group with lowest 
levels of insurance purchase are the single-earner, low income households with young 
children. It should be emphasised of course that the pattern of female labour force 
participation, and therefore the tax base, are themselves influenced by the structure of 
effective tax rates resulting from the tax-benefit system. Moreover, a move to a system in 
                                                 
22 Phases 1 to 5 contain 405, 615, 609, 537, and 617 records, respectively. 
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which health benefits are means-tested on the basis of household income from market 
labour supply effectively increases the marginal tax rate on the secondary earner, and this 
will have further effects on female labour supply and insurance purchase. This implies 
that evaluation of alternative health funding policies can only be reliably conducted in a 
broader public finance context, taking into account their overall effects on labour supply 
and the tax base.23  
 
6. Conclusions
We can summarise the main results of this paper as follows.  First, on introduction 
of the policy changes, GPs are likely to see the demand facing them as highly inelastic, 
while the cost advantage of bulk billing has been reduced, and so we would expect 
relatively large excesses of fee over bulk billing rates to emerge. These will grow over 
time if the MBS rates are not adjusted for inflation. 
A coordination problem will then emerge, because insurance premiums will 
reflect fee levels, and the demand for private insurance will be sensitive to these premium 
levels. At the aggregate level, demand responses will be higher than those perceived by 
individual GPs. It is likely therefore that fees will come to be centrally set by negotiations 
among insurers, government and GPs representatives. We see the “market for non-
hospital health services” as being divided into four segments, determined by phase in the 
life cycle, female employment status, income and health status. In order of increasing 
income they are: 
• concession card holders;  
• non-buyers of private insurance who use public hospitals’ outpatients 
departments in the event of sickness. These are likely to be lower income 
households with young children, with a higher proportion of low risks and 
single-earner households than in the population as a whole;  
• buyers of private insurance, who use public hospitals in case of costs lower 
than the deductible;  
• buyers of private insurance, who use GPs exclusively and pay out of pocket 
expenses where necessary. 
 
                                                 
23 For further and more detailed discussion of this point, see Apps and Rees (2003). 
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This raises the issue of the ability of the public hospital system to deal with the increased 
demand, and the implications of that for waiting lists and total expenditure. 
To investigate the question of who gains and who loses under the policy 
proposal,24 it is necessary to put it in a broader public finance context. To maintain the 
existing system, an increase in the MBS fee levels would be necessary, requiring 
therefore an increase in tax revenue. The policy proposal we are discussing is setting up 
an alternative financing mechanism to this. Therefore it is necessary to identify and 
quantify the real incidence and incentive effects of each kind of system. We hope in this 
paper to have made a first step in that direction. 
                                                 
24 It seems to us immediately obvious that this cannot represent a Pareto improvement, even of the potential 
variety. 
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